MODEL LAW FOR INDEPENDENT PARLIAMENTS

ESTABLISHING PARLIAMENTARY SERVICE COMMISSIONS FOR COMMONWEALTH LEGISLATURES
About the CPA
The Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA) connects, develops, promotes and supports parliamentarians and their staff to identify benchmarks of good governance and the implementation of the enduring values of the Commonwealth. The CPA collaborates with parliaments and other organisations, including the intergovernmental community, to achieve its statement of purpose. It brings parliamentarians and parliamentary staff together to exchange ideas among themselves and with experts in various fields, to identify benchmarks of good practices and new policy options they can adopt or adapt in the governance of their societies.

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Acknowledgements
The CPA Headquarters Secretariat extend its thanks to Mr Tom Duncan, Clerk of the ACT Legislative Assembly, Australia, Mr Lenox J. Proctor, Clerk of the Anguilla House of Assembly, Ms Jacqui Miller, Legislative Drafter, Jersey and Sarah Gwynn, Chair of Voyagers, New Zealand and others across the Commonwealth for their expert advice and input into this publication.

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Cover design and illustrations by Matthew Salik with elements from Adobe Stock and freepik.com

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FOREWORD

Today, more than ever, Parliaments are facing many challenges to their effectiveness. At the time of publishing, the COVID-19 global pandemic is stretching the capacity of Parliaments across the Commonwealth to remain fully functional, requiring costly resources and specialist services as well as the ability to be rapidly adaptive to new ways of working. Parliaments need the independence to remain functioning and continue to hold the Executive to account. To survive such pressures, Parliaments need to have robust leaders, services and finances to respond to such challenges.

As part of its commitment to the Latimer House Principles, as well as its work in benchmarking Parliaments against international standards, the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association has developed this Model Law to help empower Parliaments to take control away from the Executive to ensure it has the administrative, operational and financial resources it needs to function effectively.

The Model Law is designed as a Parliamentary Service Commission Bill which seeks to create a parliamentary corporate body to oversee the institution of Parliament. It has also been structured to accommodate as many versions of the ‘Westminster System’ Parliament as possible. The Model Law can be adapted to suit an array of different types of Parliaments, large or small, unicameral or bicameral.

The Model Law has been developed with expert and experienced input from leading Commonwealth legislative drafters and Parliamentary Clerks.

The Commonwealth Parliamentary Association hopes you will find this publication an invaluable resource in strengthening your parliamentary institution for the betterment of democracy within your jurisdiction and beyond.

Hon. Emilia Monjowa Lifaka MP
Chairperson of the CPA Executive Committee
Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly Cameroon
INTRODUCTION

This Model Law for Independent Parliaments is designed to support Commonwealth Legislatures that face the challenge of being insufficiently independent of the Executive, and as such, have limited access to resources and control mechanisms to function effectively in a modern democratic setting.

Many Parliaments, both large and small will not be able to rigorously scrutinise the Executive, ensure that all legislation passed is of the highest quality or provide Members with sufficient support to aid their constituents and communities. These weaknesses, frequently if not solely, derive from Parliament’s inability to access adequate financial resources, to have independent oversight of the administration and governance of Parliament and to access impartial, secure and high quality human resources. It is argued that the root cause of these failures stems from Parliament’s lack of independence from the Executive who, either wilfully or through sheer neglect, stifle the democratic process by failing to allow Parliaments the freedom and support they need to participate equally with the other branches of government (namely the Judiciary and the Executive).

Since its establishment in 1911, the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA) has sought to strengthen parliamentary institutions to enable them to fulfil their democratic mandate, specifically to hold the Executive to account. As such, the CPA has actively, and in partnership with other like-minded organisations, driven the development of the Latimer House Guidelines on Parliamentary Supremacy and Judicial Independence, the Zanzibar Recommendations for the Administration and Finance of Parliaments and more recently, the CPA Recommended Benchmarks for Democratic Legislatures. This publication has evolved from such activities. However, in spite of this work, progress to enable Parliaments to be independent, both in theory and practice, has in many cases been slow and fraught with difficulty. For example:

- Parliaments can remain unequal to their judicial counterparts which have their institutional independence enshrined in constitutional and legislative provisions.
- Some Parliaments fail to have both administrative and financial independence, typically one or the other.
- There is frequently a lack of ownership or willingness to drive any such reforms. Where these is a determination for change, such change usually emanates from senior parliamentary officials who may have little to no sway over their parliamentary or ministerial masters.
- Senior parliamentary officials also face difficulties in convincing Treasury/Finance officials to provide adequate finances from the Executive, limiting financial autonomy.
- Many Parliaments have limited legislative drafting resources to legislate for independence, and those that do, are under the domain of the Executive.

With all of the above in mind, the CPA has developed this Model Law for Commonwealth parliamentarians, senior parliamentary officials and legislative drafters to overcome these issues. This draft Law is a template for Parliaments to replicate and modify to meet their specific needs and context. Additionally, it seeks to enable Parliaments, and specifically backbench Members to present such legislation in the form of a Private Member’s Bill. In jurisdictions that have existing legal provisions, this Model Law could provide a useful comparison to determine if improvements are needed. The Model Law has been developed by using best practice examples from around the Commonwealth, most notably those used in Canada, Ghana, Kenya, New Zealand, Uganda, United Kingdom and Zambia, with input and support of many experts.

The Model Law is designed as a Parliamentary Service Commission Bill which seeks to create a parliamentary corporate body to oversee the institution of Parliament, as well as provide administrative, operational and financial independence. Whereas it is extremely difficult to develop model laws that are a one-size-fits-all approach, it is designed to accommodate as many versions of the ‘Westminster System’ Parliament as possible. The Model Law can be adapted to suit unicameral or bicameral Parliaments, small or large Legislatures at either a national or subnational level.

This Model Law attempts to guarantee that there are sufficient checks and balances to provide for an equity of powers between the Executive and Legislative branches. However, the Model Law is not a cure-all for Parliaments lacking in independence. Parliaments must also look to their powers, privileges and immunities in a holistic fashion to ensure they have all the right tools at their disposal. For example, it matters little to effective scrutiny if Parliaments have adequate committee staff numbers, but at the same time lack the powers to summon Ministers to answer questions in a timely fashion.

The material accompanying the Model Law includes a historical background to the principles behind having independent Parliaments. It then goes on to look at the rationale for why Parliaments and Governments should effect change, and how such change can be universally beneficial. There is then an examination of the Model Law itself, including accompanying commentary. The publication concludes with an appendix detailing the specific standards that such legislation should seek to comply with.
BACKGROUND

Although later in this document there is an analysis of the practical implications of not having robustly independent parliamentary institutions, it is important to first look at the theoretical and historical reasoning behind such an approach.

Arguably, for as long as there have been democratic institutions like ‘Parliaments’ there has been the concept of the separation of powers. The origins of such a concept dates back to ancient Greece and Aristotle, through to John Locke, Baron de la Montesquieu, David Hume and James Madison in the Enlightenment period. Regardless of its history, the principle is the same, power should not be vested in any single person or institution. Initially it was intended to prevent absolutist monarchs abusing power. To mitigate this risk, there should instead be a balance of power shared out and managed in unison with adequate checks and balances in place. Separate but balanced. This ‘Separation of Powers Doctrine’ contends that powers should be distributed between an Executive, a Legislature and a Judiciary. Each of these three institutions or Branches should have their unique roles and responsibilities, but should work together each providing accountability mechanisms over the other. As highlighted in the illustration below, these ‘three cogs’ can sometimes face ‘friction’ which disrupts the mechanics of good democratic governance. The Executive can obstruct the movement of the Legislature, as can the Judiciary obstruct the Executive, and so on. For example, the Executive should not make laws or administer justice and Parliament should not pass laws that are arbitrary and/or inconsistent.

In recent years, the CPA and the Commonwealth have worked actively to strengthen good governance processes and specifically the ethos of the Separation of Powers Doctrine to reduce as much friction as possible. A number of these principles which reinforce the need for parliamentary independence, and are sanctioned by Commonwealth Parliaments and Governments are laid out in the following section.
Commonwealth Latimer House Principles
In June 1998 a group of distinguished parliamentarians, judges, lawyers and legal academics joined together at Latimer House in Buckinghamshire, United Kingdom, at a Colloquium on Parliamentary Sovereignty and Judicial Independence within the Commonwealth. The Colloquium was sponsored by the Commonwealth Lawyers’ Association, the Commonwealth Legal Education Association, the Commonwealth Magistrates’ and Judges’ Association and the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association with the support of the Commonwealth Foundation, the Commonwealth Secretariat and the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The product of the Colloquium, The Latimer House Guidelines on Parliamentary Supremacy and Judicial Independence evolved into the Commonwealth (Latimer House) Principles on the Three Branches of Government. The Principles highlight the importance of the separation of powers between the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary to ensure effective governance and democracy. The Latimer House Principles provide guidance on the role of the separation of powers in the Commonwealth, its effectiveness in providing democratic governance and the role of civil society. The Principles were first approved by Commonwealth Law Ministers in 2002 and endorsed by the Commonwealth Heads of Government at their meeting in Abuja, Nigeria in 2003.

Section III of the Principles state:
Independence of Parliamentarians: (a) Parliamentarians must be able to carry out their legislative and constitutional functions in accordance with the Constitution, free from unlawful interference.

In March 2013, the first Commonwealth Charter adopted by Commonwealth Heads of Government validated the Latimer House Principles on maintaining integrity of the three branches of government (article VI).

“We recognise the importance of maintaining the integrity of the roles of the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary. These are the guarantors in their respective spheres of the rule of law, the promotion and protection of fundamental human rights and adherence to good governance.”

CPA Recommended Benchmarks for Democratic Legislatures
In 2018, twenty years after the initial establishment of the Latimer House Guidelines, the CPA completed a consultation and review process that resulted in the adoption of updated Recommended Benchmarks for Democratic Legislatures. The Benchmarks provide a minimum standard and a guide on how a Parliament should be constituted and how it should function. They play an important role in developing the effectiveness of parliamentary institutions across the 180 Parliaments and Legislatures of the CPA and contribute to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Most notably, the Benchmarks highlight minimum standards to ensure Parliaments have mechanisms in place to be as independent as possible (see appendix for those specific Benchmarks). Since 2018, twelve Parliaments have undertaken assessments based on the Benchmarks. The findings of their assessments form the basis of this Model Law.

CPA Study Group on Finance and Administration of Parliaments
In 2005, the CPA in partnership with the World Bank Institute sponsored a study group to identify best practice in corporate management structures across Commonwealth Parliaments, produce recommendations for the establishment of new corporate bodies, examine methods of increasing accountability for the use of public funds and services and develop the capacity of the CPA to assist Branches with issues of corporate management. The study group made twenty-seven recommendations (see appendix for those specific recommendations). These recommendations are the foundation blocks of the Model Law and are essential principles for Legislatures to adhere to.

64th Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference, Kampala, Uganda, September 2019 - Workshop: The Role of Parliament in the doctrine of Separation of Powers; Enhancing Transparency and Accountability
At the CPAs Annual Conference held in Uganda in 2019, a workshop took place focusing on the role of Parliament and the doctrine of the separation of powers. The workshop panellists including: Hon. Shri Rajendra Trivedi MLA, Speaker of the Legislative Assembly (Gujarat, India); Hon. Shamsul Iskandar Mohd Akin MP (Malaysia); Hon. John Mbadi Ng’ongo MP (Kenya); Mr Brian Speers, President, Commonwealth Lawyers Association (CLA) and moderated by Hon. Christine St-Pierre MNA (Québec, Canada). Participants examined the doctrine and highlighted that the Legislature should be resolute in protecting its space. This should be guarded by the level of determination of the head of the Legislature. Rt Hon. Rebecca Kadaga MP, Speaker of Parliament (Uganda), noted in her personal experience, that Legislatures must utilize mechanisms that make it difficult for the Executive to overrun the Legislature and in so doing undermine the Separation of Powers Doctrine. The workshop participants made a number of recommendations (see appendix for those specific recommendations).
THE PARLIAMENTARY RATIONALE

The principal reason as to why independent Parliaments should be an essential characteristic of any democracy is because, without financial or administrative independence, Parliaments struggle to perform their basic functions effectively. The simple fact of the matter is if Parliaments want sufficient staffing levels of high quality, secure, impartial, professional officials to support Members in their core legislative, scrutiny, oversight and representative functions, that can only be developed and secured by enacting legislation such as this Model Law or through a Constitutional provision. For those Parliaments that have not gone down this route, there are many problems that will inevitably arise.

1. Who owns Parliament?
The answer to this question given by parliamentarians varies from “the people” to “the Speaker”. But in reality the institution of Parliament is owned by parliamentarians who should determine the rules that structure its systems. This happens by rules of procedure which parliamentarians vote on, yet when it comes to how the Parliament is overseen, strangely many parliamentarians are content that this should fall to the Executive, directly or indirectly. By creating statutory corporate bodies like a Parliamentary Service Commission, such an entity can fill in the administrative and operational gaps left by Standing Orders, precedent, rulings by the Speaker and the Constitution. It can set policies, guidelines, strategies that enhance the functions and performance of Parliaments as well as manage risk and financial transparency. Most importantly, it can provide clarity to all relevant stakeholders, be it the Executive, Members of Parliament, staff and the public as to who is responsible, accountable and answerable for the management and governance of Parliament.

2. Democratic deficit
Parliaments that have little to no powers to appropriate sufficient funds for the operation of their legislatures or have little to no authority to manage staffing requirements will face the following difficulties:

- If Parliaments do not have access to necessary funds, the results can be poor pay provisions for Members in terms of salary or expenses. In turn, there will be a systematic barrier for candidates from more impoverished backgrounds who may want to become parliamentarians or more problematically, incentivise parliamentarians in sourcing alternative forms of remuneration which will inevitably result in conflicts of interest. Members may be forced to find additional sources of income such as a second job. As such, they cannot dedicate all their time to being a parliamentarian and the many pressures associated with the role.
- Parliaments that have poor physical infrastructure because of a lack of funding may be a barrier to effective and efficient working. Specifically, there may not be adequate space to conduct parliamentary business, there may be health and safety risks, it may not provide for adequate facilities which acts as a barrier to greater diversity of women and disabled parliamentarians and staff. There may also be a lack of space to accommodate the official opposition.
- Clerks and officials appointed by the Executive may be political appointees with little to no impartiality and who may not give balanced advice to all Members regardless of their party political persuasion. Staff recruited may not be sufficiently expert in their procedural roles and therefore might not follow Standing Orders correctly. Impartial and specialist staff that give effective advice to the opposition may be moved on to other public service departments or be placed under undue influence for fear of being fired.
- There may not be sufficient financial provision for technology or staffing in place to keep an updated record of parliamentary proceedings, such as the official record/Hansard. Members may not have a formal minute of what was in a Minister’s statement or an answer to a question.
- A Parliament without sufficient staffing provision may not be able to provide independently-sourced research or adequate staffing for all legislative or standing committees. Members will therefore be handicapped in their ability to effectively hold the Executive to account or amend legislation to ensure it is fit for purpose.

Many of the above examples happen everyday among Commonwealth Parliaments. The best way of overcoming such Executive interference is to strive for greater parliamentary independence.

3. Low on the to-do list
In the absence of Parliamentary Service Commissions, or their equivalents, Parliaments have a tendency to be administered like any other Ministry or Government Department. However, unlike their ministerial counterparts, these subservient Legislatures may be given less support, resources and time. In other words, they risk becoming neglected and overlooked institutions. Worse still, personnel assigned to oversee Parliament’s operations and funding may consequently be less skilled and less aware of the unique requirements and characteristics of a Parliament. They may not realise why it is important to have more time allocated to debating and scrutinising legislation, why a committee or committees need access to a minibus to visit important sites related to a specific
inquiry, what the difference is between a committee clerk or a committee specialist, or why post-legislative scrutiny is different to pre-legislative scrutiny, and the different skillsets required for both. In addition, personnel assigned to oversee parliamentary operations are also under the direction and authority of government authorities. The determination of the terms and conditions of service including promotion is in most cases the responsibility of the Executive Branch. Such divided loyalties has the potential of stifling or affecting the operations and therefore compromising the independence of Parliament. It is therefore essential that a Commission exists, or some other separate administrative body, which oversees its staffing and resource requirements, and determines how much money is needed to deliver the best service possible to ensure Parliament is a fully effective institution.

4. **Public perception**

It is essential that the public have confidence in Parliament as an institution which is intended to safeguard democracy. Lack of public confidence in Parliament over questions or doubts about its independence, and therefore its ability to hold the Executive to account, will have a number of knock-on effects, which parliamentarians must work actively to overcome. These may take the shape of voter apathy at elections, a lack of engagement in the parliamentary process, such as petitioning or contributing to committee inquiries, or feeling it is worth their time lobbying their Members to be active on issues that impact upon them. The public will question whether parliamentarians deserve their salaries and benefits. Parliaments and parliamentarians must therefore demonstrate their independence from the Executive and be able to flex their democratic muscles when necessary.

5. **The Domino Effect**

It is important to also consider the wider ramifications of not having effective independence as a Parliament. The Legislature is not the only entity that may exist in a jurisdiction that scrutinises the Executive. There are often other independent parliamentary offices/ombudsmen/commissioners which may sit within or as part of the Legislative apparatus. If Parliament is not independently funded or administered then it is reasonable to assume that these bodies, like Auditors-General, Parliamentary Commissioners for Standards or even Election Commissioners will be either. Where Parliaments lead, others should follow. Parliament therefore should seek to strengthen their institutional independence alongside others, or do so as an umbrella body and thus ensure there is effective oversight of the Executive.

6. **Never make the grade**

Whilst Parliaments stick to the coattails of the Executive, they will fail to meet the key international benchmarks that the CPA and others have set. Following a review of numerous CPA Benchmark self-assessments, there is clear evidence to suggest that Parliaments perform far better in their democratic and good governance responsibilities than those which have limited or non-existent independent Commissions or independent funding appropriations.

7. **More than just a Legislature**

In the 21st Century, Parliaments should perform more than just the basic functions of passing laws or holding committee inquiries. They have an important part to play in educating the public and importantly young people on democratic values. They need to be a forum to raise awareness on national and global challenges, from climate change to global pandemics. To do this, Parliaments must have access to technology and other resources to meet the expectations and needs of the people, such as modern IT equipment to undertake e-outreach, or facilities to enable remote working to cater to modern working conditions. However, Parliaments that lack access to funding due to their dependence on the Executive will struggle to remain relevant and evolve as all institutions need to do.
THE GOVERNMENT RATIONALE

It is important to take a moment to look at the issue from an Executive perspective. Whereas it may be obvious to Parliaments what the benefits of greater independence can be (see previous section). For the Executive, loosening their grip on a Legislature and thereby strengthening Parliament's ability to question decisions and make embarrassing observations on the failures and inadequacies of Government policy, would be hard to contemplate. It is easy so see why any Government would want to obstruct any attempts at giving Parliaments greater financial and administrative autonomy. But the simple fact of the matter is, without the majority's support, there can be little chance for constitutional or legislative reform such as this Model Law. It is therefore essential to highlight what the Executive can gain by relinquishing some control over Parliament's purse-strings, and allowing it to govern itself free from the potential excesses of Executive interference. When a politically pragmatic approach is taken, it can in fact be a considerable advantage for the Executive. Below are a list of some of the arguments for why the Executive should be willing to accept this law.

1. **Rules aren't meant to be broken**
   Every Commonwealth country has committed to uphold the Commonwealth Charter and Latimer House Principles that states: “Parliamentarians must be able to carry out their legislative and constitutional functions in accordance with the Constitution, free from unlawful interference”. As such, Governments that fail to provide such freedoms from interference are failing to meet such commitments. Governments in fact risk embarrassment and international criticism if they do not fulfil their regional, Commonwealth-wide or international standards.

   It is also important to stress that all Commonwealth jurisdictions have an obligation under the Sustainable Development Goals to meet key targets. Global Goal 16 which clearly states: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. Specifically Target 16.6 - Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels and Target 16.7 - Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels. As such, Governments have a duty to ensure Parliaments are fully effective institutions for participatory and representative decision-making.

   At a national level, Governments will also have to ensure that commitments under national constitutions and other domestic laws are also met. Pressure may exist from civil society, the media and other groups to ensure that the Government uphold the highest standards to protect democratic values.

2. **Here today and gone tomorrow**
   Governments must consider the long-term. For example, it is important for them to contemplate the possibility that although they are the Government today, at the next election they might be out of power and in the opposition ranks. If they are in a Legislature that is limited in its independence from the Executive, being in the opposition can be a stifling and constrained position to be in. There will be little to no resources, little to no office space, a partial and bias Parliamentary Service, etc. Therefore the Executive, for perhaps selfish reasons, should set a precedent and invest in the opposition of the day to secure the benefits later on. If anything, this may result in the current Executive being in opposition only temporarily. It is therefore in the long-term interest of the Government to provide adequate resources for all.

3. **Plausible Deniability Factor**
   At times, the Government will have difficult and unpopular decisions to make. Should the Government spend public money on large infrastructure programmes or do they pay for an increase in Members pay, or for the Parliament to have a refurbished chamber? A chamber that may also serve the interests of the Executive. Governments that pay for that new chamber will most likely be considered self-indulgent, neglecting the people and be on the receiving end of a great deal of bad press. But what if it was not the Government's responsibility or decision? What if Parliament made that decision? By delegating powers and responsibilities on to Parliament, the Executive is potentially freeing itself from making unpopular and difficult decisions.

4. **Passing the buck**
   Government Ministers and their departments are busy and seldom have sufficient staffing or financial provisions to provide adequate support for meeting the day-to-day pressures of governing a country or territory. This is especially so in small jurisdictions. Departments of Public Administration, Offices of the Prime Minister, Ministries of Internal Affairs are frequently given the burdensome task of overseeing the Legislature, and in many places, delivering on this requirement is unfortunately perceived by many to be a distraction from the core work of these
Ministries. Furthermore, overseeing the Legislature is an exceptionally specialist field and there is an opportunity cost for Ministries in hiring legislative experts or experts on financial compliance or human resources. As such, it can be to the Executive’s advantage if the administering and financing of the Legislature can be delegated to others, more notably the Legislature itself.

5. **Role for Government Backbenchers**
The reality for most governing parties is that they cannot give ministerial positions, junior or senior, to everyone. In most jurisdictions, particularly small ones, there are limits in place to ensure that there are always some Members who must remain as backbench Members of Parliament. Therefore the Government of the day must then think of what to do with such individuals to give them something worthwhile and influential to do. This is politically expedient in seeking to mitigate the risk of Members of the governing party defecting to other parties for better positions, or being rebellious and not voting with the Government. A well resourced Parliament that can administer committees will need Chairs and Members to populate them, a well resourced Parliament may need Members on the Parliamentary Service Commission which will carry enormous influence, a well funded Parliament can facilitate parliamentary diplomacy activities and outreach work. All of which are valuable and important roles that government backbenchers can and should take on.

6. **You get what you pay for**
In the Westminster System, Ministers are parliamentarians and therefore have to fulfil part of their work in Parliament. But a poorly administered, poorly resourced Legislature can be detrimental to Governments as well as ordinary backbench Members. For example, if Ministers have to answer questions that are already in the public domain, this is arguably a waste of their time and the time of the Ministry in researching and formulating an answer. But if the Legislature had a Table Office with sufficient staffing and expertise this could enable a good system of questions and answers that can benefit the Minister (who may not know the answer), the MP who asked the question, and the public and civil society who will see that the government is operating with an abundance of transparency and accountability. A well resourced Parliament that has experienced, impartial, qualified staff can offer advice to Ministers (as parliamentarians) as much as they can for others.

7. **Still in control**
Many Governments make a mistake by assuming that by delegating powers to Parliament or giving Parliaments greater independence will somehow result in the Government losing control and influence over what Parliament does. The reality is that the Government in a ‘Westminster System’ will still retain significant influence. After all, the Government and the governing party Members in Parliament will still be in the majority (although there are occasionally minority Governments). If a Commission is created, the majority of its Members will and should be from the governing party/parties; and in many instances the governing majority or a separate Executive (in more presidential systems) will elect or appoint a Presiding Officer who will Chair such a Commission. If a Parliamentary Service Commission places too great a financial burden on the national finances, it would be a Government held majority in Parliament that would seek to vote against such budgetary provisions, or a Head of State who could veto. Furthermore, the Parliament would have the power to overturn or ratify any decision a Commission makes and therefore yet again, if the majority is from the Government benches then the Government can still hold sway in what decisions are made and how. Although this may not be universally applicable, especially when consideration is given to the power-dynamics between national Executives and subnational Legislatures. For example the political party of the Executive at a national level may not be the majority party at a subnational legislative level. However, there will inevitably be mechanisms that exist for the Executive at the national level to work in a consultative manner to reach amicable outcomes with subnational stakeholders to maintain an element of influence if not direct control.
**STEP 1**
Parliaments should establish a Working Group of key senior parliamentarians and officials to review the Model Law and other relevant documents (for example, the Constitution, existing legislation, Standing Orders, etc.), as well as examine existing arrangements for managing the Parliament. Keeping in mind the need, nature and purpose of reform.

**STEP 2**
Parliaments should undertake an internal consultation with parliamentarians and officials as well as government stakeholders to seek their views.

**STEP 3**
Legislative drafters should draft the Parliamentary Service Commission Bill with input from key parliamentarians and lay before Parliament as either a Government Bill or Private Member’s Bill.

**STEP 4**
The Bill should follow the legislative process in the Parliament (specific to individual jurisdictions).

**STEP 5**
If successful, senior officers of Parliament (the Speaker, Clerk, etc.) should begin the process of implementing the Act in a transparent, communicative and open fashion which meets the short and long-term needs of Parliament.

**STEP 6**
Following the complete implementation of the Act and after a reasonable period (for example 6 months to a year), the Commission should undertake a holistic review, including a broad consultation with relevant stakeholders on the actions taken, assess the results and examine whether there is a need for further reforms. Ensure outcomes are publicly available.

**STEP 7**
Following an election and new Parliament, the Commission should undertake a further assessment and continue to do so at regulate periods. Such reviews can also be done by independent agents to ensure broader perspectives are taken on-board.
COUNTRY CASE STUDIES

MALAYSIA – A bicameral approach

The Parliament of Malaysia, a bicameral Parliament (comprising of the Dewan Rakyat or House of Representatives and the Dewan Negara or Senate) has no single Parliamentary Service Commission. However, there are House Committee’s for the House and Senate which includes of the Speaker and the President respectively, both of whom act as the Chairman. Both Committees advise their respective Chairman on all matters related to all the conveniences, services and privileges of each Chamber. Both Committees have the power to assemble or conduct meetings as a Joint Committee.

A Parliamentary Service Act was enacted and enforced in 1963, but it was repealed in 1993. The appointment of the members of parliamentary service is determined in accordance with the public service’s general policy and staffed by the members of the general public service who fall under the control of executive branch (Prime Minister Department).

The position of Chief Administrator is appointed from the Public Service and responsible for the administration and financial affairs of Parliament. The Chief Administrator is assisted by two Secretaries of the Parliament; the Clerk of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives. The Constitution stipulates that both Clerks shall be appointed by His Majesty the King of Malaysia.

There is no independent body or mechanism responsible for setting and administering MPs’ pay and pensions, independently of both Parliament and Government. The remuneration, benefits and other statutory entitlements of legislators are subjected to the Members of Parliament (Remuneration) Act 1980.

GHANA – A unicameral approach

Ghana has a unicameral Parliament. The Parliament of Ghana has its own Parliamentary Service which was established by the 1993 Parliamentary Service Act (PSA), pursuant to Article 124 of the 1992 Constitution. Staff of the Service are required to be non-partisan. It’s Commission also known as the Parliamentary Service Board, is chaired by the Speaker who is responsible for policy, control and determination of the conditions of service of staff.

The recruitment and adequacy of staff of the Service is regulated by the Scheme of Service and the Parliamentary Service (Staff) Regulation, CI 118. Pay is comparable to the Public Service. The Clerk to Parliament is the head of the Parliamentary Service.

The financial autonomy of the legislature is guaranteed by Article 179(2) of the Constitution and Act 460 of 1993 which provides that administrative and operational expenses of the Parliamentary Service are neither subject to budgetary review or control by the Ministry of Finance nor to be voted on, but only laid before Parliament for the information of Members. However, in practice, the legislature submits budget estimates to the Ministry of Finance which makes substantive changes in the estimates.
SCOTLAND, UK – A subnational approach

The Scottish Parliament, one of the newer Parliaments of the CPA was established in 1999. As a unicameral subnational legislature it has its own corporate body. The Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body (SPCB) is a statutory body provided for by the Scotland Act 1998 and consists of at least 5 members – the Presiding Officer, who chairs the Body, and at least 4 Members elected by the Parliament. Members are elected as individuals to represent the interests of all the MSPs and not as party representatives. The SPCB provides the staff, accommodation and services needed by the Parliament to carry out its work. The SPCB is accountable to the Scottish Parliament.

The Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body employs around 450 staff dedicated to supporting the work of the Parliament and its Members. As such, staff work directly for the Parliament and not the wider Scottish Government’s civil service.

Funding for the Scottish Parliament is sourced from the UK following the transfer of the main UK Consolidated Revenue Fund to the Scottish equivalent. The SPCB sets the budget of the Scottish Parliament which is submitted to the Finance and Constitution Committee of the Scottish Parliament which is then submitted to the Scottish Government for noting. The budget for the Parliament is then incorporated into the main Budget Bill which is voted on by the Scottish Parliament.
HOW TO USE THIS MODEL LAW

The Model Law is divided into six parts. Part 1 is the preliminary or introductory part of the Model Law which sets out the parameters of the Law including its title and interpretations of terms used.

Part 2 establishes the Parliamentary Service Commission as a corporate body. It then proposes a composition for the Commission. The basis of this has been determined by similar Commissions that exist across Commonwealth Parliaments as well as some elements deemed to be best practice, for example the inclusion of an external member to the Commission. The remaining provisions of Part 2 propose the composition variations dependent on the vacation of membership, or in the instance that the Parliament dissolves.

It is important to stress that the Model Law is based on a unicameral Parliament as opposed to a bicameral one. For those wishing to adopt this Model Law, it is necessary to determine early on if the Commission should cover both Legislatures or just one, which may then precipitate having two separate laws. Whichever option is considered it is essential to consider the relationship and interactions between both Legislatures. In particular, who has supremacy, how independent do the two chambers wish to be, are services shared and if so, how will decisions be ultimately taken? It is perhaps advisable that the Law covers both Legislatures with a mixed membership on the Commission. The rationale for such an approach, beyond simplifying the reform process, is that the Parliament speaking with one voice would have greater weight in leveraging the required funding needs. However, history and precedent may prevent such an approach.

Furthermore, this Model Law does not cover the role of the Opposition, nor does it confer powers or specific support for the office of the Leader of the Opposition. Many laws on Parliamentary Service Commissions do provide such provisions. However, to ensure this Model Law is as applicable as possible, it has not been included here. Nevertheless, it is important that Opposition and independent representatives have a presence and a voice on any Commission and is therefore included as part of this Model Law.

Part 3 of the Model Law, which is arguably one of the most important, deals with the functions and powers of the Commission and by extension the powers and independence of Parliament. Part 3 examines the interconnectedness of the Commission and the institution of Parliament. In particular, emphasising that Parliament has the final say, and can through resolutions, overturn decisions of the Commission. As such, it ensures there are sufficient checks and balances internally within Parliament as well as Parliament’s relationship with the Executive. Part 3 is also concerned with the management and oversight of the Parliamentary service. Finally, Part 3 outlines what the limitations are of the Commission.

Equally important is Part 4 of the Model Law which establishes the Commission and Parliament’s financial independence. It is vital however to emphasise that Parliament cannot be 100 percent financially independent because of the principles of the separation of powers doctrine which give the Executive resources (namely the public service) who will determine what funds there are. As such, it is the Executive which has the capability to determine how public funds are administered. Therefore Parliament must inevitably work in tandem with the Executive. It is ultimately about distinguishing the theoretical authority with the practical realities. Executives that are not consulted can slow or obstruct the process of distributing funds even when Parliament exerts its sovereign powers. With this in mind, the Model Law has been designed to give the appropriate authority to Parliament through the Commission to determine estimates and to appropriate them, but in a consultative manner. Nevertheless, Parliament through the budget approval process will get the final say. It cannot be a situation, as it is in some jurisdictions, whereby the Executive pays for the services and outputs that Parliament provides. This Provider-Service model places too much control in the hands of the Executive.

Part 4 also contains provisions for how public funds should be allocated by the Commission. As a starting point, it proposes funding should go towards the costs of the Parliamentary service and Members’ remuneration. It also gives provisions that enable the Commission to access funds from alternative sources, such as development agencies. In principle, the Model Law could be extended to support any parliamentary semi-autonomous ombudsman or commission, and potentially copy a New Zealand model for distributing election expenses should these come from public funds.

Part 5 of the Model Law details what the Parliamentary Service should comprise of, including the Clerk of Parliament. It builds into the Model Law flexibility for the Commission to manage the service as it sees fit, but again, ensuring Parliament has the final say. Importantly though, it emphasises that the service is independent of any Executive-controlled public service.

Finally Part 6 covers the essential provisions which should ensure a smooth transitional process for moving from an existing system to the one resulting from this Model Law.
PARLIAMENTARY SERVICE COMMISSION BILL

PART 1 – PRELIMINARY
Introduction
Short Title
Commencement
Interpretations

PART 2 – PARLIAMENTARY SERVICE COMMISSION
Incorporation
Composition of the Commission

PART 3 – FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSION
Independence and Delegation of Powers
Employing Staff
Powers of the Parliamentary Service Commission
Parliamentary Precinct
Limitations on the Commission

PART 4 – FINANCIAL POWERS AND PROVISIONS
Financial Independence
Financial Accountability
Members Pay and Remuneration
Additional Revenue Raising Powers

PART 5 – PARLIAMENTARY SERVICE
Clerk of the Parliament
Principle Duties of the Parliamentary Service

PART 6 – TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS
PARLIAMENTARY SERVICE COMMISSION BILL

An ACT to make provision for the establishment of the Parliamentary Service Commission to oversee the administration and functions of Parliament; for conferring powers on Parliament to regulate its own finances, and for connected purposes.

PART 1

Introduction

Short Title

1. (1) The Act may be cited as the Parliamentary Service Commission Act.

Commencement

1. (1) This Act comes into force on 1 January 2020.

Interpretations

2. (1) In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears:

“Accounting Officer” has overall responsibility for the Parliament’s finances, resource accounting and internal controls;

“Commission” means the Parliamentary Service Commission established under Part 1;

“Corporate Officer” has the authority to acquire, hold, manage and dispose of property, and to enter into contracts on behalf of Parliament;

“Development Assistance” means those financial flows to the Parliament which are provided by international or national official agencies and each transaction of which is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries;

“Donor Organisations” means those organisations that provide Development Assistance;

“External Member” means the person established under Section 4.(1)(g);

“Governing Party” means the party or parties which controls a majority in Parliament;

“Key performance Indicators” or KPIs means the mechanism to evaluate the success of the Parliament or an activity in which Parliament engages;

“Leader of the Opposition” means the person who is the leader of the opposition party or party grouping in Parliament;

“Opposition” means second largest party or party grouping in Parliament;

“Precinct” means the land and premises which is used by Parliament;

“Public Service” means the civil service provided by the government in the service of the state;

“Service” means the Parliamentary Service established under Section 14.

Although this Model Law calls such a Commission a Parliamentary Service Commission, the body could be called a Parliamentary Administration Commission or House Service Commission. The use of Committee however should be avoided to prevent confusion with formal standing or select committees of Parliament.

This date is dependent on the date the Act comes into force.

This may be expanded to include other terms and provisions.

Definitions of the Governing Party or Opposition may differ dependent on the definitions of respective jurisdictions. For example, the governing party maybe the largest party or grouping in Parliament or the same party of the Executive, which may differ in a presidential system.
PART 2

Parliamentary Services Commission

Incorporation

3. (1). There must be a body corporate named the Parliamentary Service Commission to perform the functions conferred on it by this Act.

(2). The Commission is not an instrument of the executive government.

Composition of the Commission

4. (1). The Commission must consist of –

(a). The Speaker of the Parliament who must be the Chairperson,

(b). A Deputy Speaker of the Parliament who must be Vice-Chairperson,

(c). The Clerk of the Parliament,

(d). A Member of Parliament from the governing party,
   (i). nominated by the Government; and
   (ii). who must not be a member of the Cabinet;

(e). A Member of Parliament from the opposition,
   (i). nominated by the Leader of the Opposition;

(f). An Independent Member of Parliament,
   (i). elected by independent Members of Parliament;

(g). An external member appointed by resolution of Parliament,
   (i). based on merit and through open and fair competition; and
   (ii). must not be—
      (a). a Member of Parliament; or
      (b). a member of the Parliamentary Service; and
   (iii). who must not be under Executive control;

(h). An official of the Parliamentary Service who must serve as Secretary to the Commission,
   (i). who is appointed by the Chairperson;
   (ii). but who must not have voting rights.

This provision establishes the Commission as a Corporate Body.

This is dependent on whether it is a bicameral Parliament or not. If unicameral, then the Deputy Speaker may be Vice-Chairperson. If bicameral then the Presiding Officer of the Upper House may be Vice-Chairperson the Chairpersonship of the Commission may rotate between presiding officers on an annual or sessional basis.

As the Senior Accounting Officer and Head of the Parliamentary Service it would be considered to give a stronger voice to the Parliamentary Service if the Clerk was given an equal voice to Members on the Commission, however they could also be Secretary to the Commission.

If the intention is to have a Commission that is reflective of the political composition of the Parliament or respective Chamber then more Members should be added. This will also ensure there is a quorum.

How independent Members may undertake an election would be specific to the jurisdiction, which could also be defined here. An election is important to give the individual/s more influence on the Commission.

It is considered good practice to also include an external member on the Commission. This can assist in giving an independent and expert voice. For example an accountant or an expert in corporate governance.

Although it is proposed that they are appointed by resolution, alternatively they could be appointed by an Appointments Committee or panel.

A decision should also be taken on whether they have voting rights and their levels of remuneration and terms and conditions of employment.

There may be other types of Members (Chieftains/Elders, reserve Members representing women, the disabled or young people that should also be included on the Commission.

There is also value in specifying what would constitute a quorum. However this would be determined by the exact composition of the Commission.
(2). A member of the Commission must vacate office –

(a). upon the dissolution of Parliament prior to a general election; or

(b). in the case of a Member of Parliament, if that member ceases to be a Member of Parliament other than by reason of the dissolution of Parliament;

(c). if he or she becomes disqualified for appointment;

(d). if the member fails to attend 3 consecutive meetings of the Commission;

(e). is unfit to discharge his or her functions as a member;

(f). is incapacitated by physical or mental illness;

(g). if a member resigns from the Commission;

i. after submitting their notice in writing one month in advance to the Chairperson of the Commission unless a waiver for this period has been issued by the Chairperson of the Commission;

(h). is formally removed as a member of the Commission by a resolution of Parliament.

(3). If the office of Chairperson of the Commission is vacant or the Chairperson is for any reason unable to exercise the functions of their office, then, until a Speaker has been elected and has assumed the functions of Chairperson, or until the person holding that office has resumed those functions, as the case may be, the Vice-Chairperson must be the Chairperson.

(4). If the office of Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson is vacant, one of the other members of the Commission must act as Chairperson and the Vice-Chairperson until a person has been elected to the office of Speaker and assumed the functions of Chairperson.

(5). Past service is no bar to nomination or appointment as a member of the Commission.
PART 3

Functions of the Commission

Independence and Delegation of Powers

5. (1). In the exercise of its powers or the performance of its functions under this Act, the Commission must not be subject to the direction or control of any other person or authority;

(a). other than through a resolution of Parliament.

(2). Subject to this section, the Commission may,

(a). determine its own procedure; and

(b). with the consent of the Executive, as may be appropriate, may confer powers or impose duties on any public officer or authority for the purpose of the discharge of its functions.

(3). The Commission may, by directions in writing, delegate any of its powers under this section to any one or more of its members, Parliamentary Committees or to any officer in the Parliamentary Service;

(a). in creating a Parliamentary Committee to assist in its work, the Commission must do so by a resolution of Parliament and with approval of Parliament amend the procedures/Standing Orders, where applicable.

Employing Staff

6. (1). The Commission must have the powers to appoint all staff in the Parliamentary Service, and must determine their numbers and their remuneration and other terms and conditions of service.

(2). The Commission must ensure that the complementing, grading, pay and allowances of staff in the Parliament are kept reasonably consistent with those in the public service so far as consistent with the requirements of the Parliament.

(3). The other conditions of service of staff in the Parliament are also kept broadly in line with those in the public service.

(4). Notwithstanding anything to the contrary appearing in this section, the Commission may -

(a). engage persons under individual contracts of service upon such terms and conditions as the Commission may determine;

(b). engage any person who, in its opinion, possesses expert knowledge or is otherwise able to assist in connection with the exercise of its functions, to make such inquiries or to conduct such research or to make such reports as may be necessary for the efficient and effective carrying out of its functions;

(c). appoint competent persons, whether members of the Commission or not, to be a committee(s) to assist the Commission on such matters within the scope of its functions as are referred to them.
(5). The Commission must ensure that pensions and other similar benefits of staff of the Parliamentary Service are kept in line with the provisions of the public service, but need not do so in the case for whom provision for such benefits was made under another scheme before they entered service in the Parliament and continues to be so made in respect of such service.

(6). The Commission must have the powers to exercise disciplinary control over staff of the Parliamentary Service, consistent with employment laws and the specific terms and conditions of service in their employment agreement.

(7). The Commission must ensure there is a staff performance appraisal system in place like that used by the public service and must set objectives for those in the Parliamentary Service to meet on an annual basis or at intervals determined by the Commission.

(8). The Commission must promote the welfare of Members of the House and members of staff and the dignity of Parliament.

Powers of the Parliamentary Service

7. (1). Make publically available an annual report on the work of the Parliament and the Commission including audited accounts and budget estimates.

(2). Make publically available a code of conduct for staff of the Parliamentary Service, which is to be reviewed on an annual basis.

(3). Make publically available a Strategic Plan for the Parliament which must include key performance indicators and strategies for public engagement, education and outreach.

Parliamentary Precinct

8. (1). The control and administration of the whole of the parliamentary precincts is vested in the Parliamentary Service Commission on behalf of the Parliament, whether Parliament is in session or not.

(2). The Commission and every person authorised by the Commission for this purpose has, and may exercise, in respect of every part of the parliamentary precincts, all the powers of an occupier.

(3). The Commission may from time to time, by resolution of Parliament —

(a). add any land or premises to the parliamentary precincts; or

(b). exclude from the parliamentary precincts any land or premises that are part of the parliamentary precincts by virtue of this Act.

(4). The Parliamentary Services Commission must delegate to the Speaker of Parliament in coordination with the Clerk of Parliament and other relevant individuals the day to day management of the precinct, and with specific reference to the security and access arrangements on and to the precinct.

For the purposes of this Model Law, the scope of the Commission does not extend to the hiring of staff for Members themselves, such as constituency caseworkers or special advisers. In many jurisdictions Members prefer to do so independently. Although the Law could be amended to do so.

Typically Commissions only appoint staff directly for the Parliamentary Service and for all Members. This prevents the Commission being forced to get involved in recruitment, disciplinary or pay conditions for Members personal appointments.

The Commission may wish to set guidance, advice and procedures, but that should arguably be the extent of its involvement.

It is advisable that Commissions are encouraged to ensure staff perform to the highest of standards and their welfare remains enshrined as a priority.

These provisions highlight the need for the Commission to be robust in their governance, strategic and public engagement role.

It is essential that the Commission and Parliament has control over its own precincts to ensure physical independence from the executive. This is to ensure the government does not limit access to Parliament, impose its security on Parliament or limit Parliament’s potential commercial use of the precinct.

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Limitations on the Commission

9. (1). The Commission does not have a role in relation to—

(a). business transacted at meetings of Parliament or meetings of committees of Parliament; or

(b). any other proceedings of Parliament; or

(c). any matter for which the Clerk of Parliament has responsibility, as set down in the Constitution (and amendments) and the Standing Orders of Parliament or subsequent amendments to these regulations.
PART 4


Financial Independence

10. (1). The Parliamentary Service Commission must have the power —

(a). to provide such services and facilities as are necessary to ensure efficient and effective functioning of the Parliament;

(b). to direct and supervise the administration of the services and facilities provided by, and exercise budgetary control over, the Service;

(c). to prepare and lay before Parliament in each financial year estimates of expenditure, which must be a charge on the Consolidated Fund for the Parliamentary Service, for the following financial year;

(d). to determine, through consultation with the Executive, but without prior consent from any authority other than the Parliament, an amount appropriated under an annual Appropriation Act in respect of the Parliamentary service.

Financial Accountability

11. (1). The Parliamentary Service Commission must —

(a). be audited and a report thereon laid before Parliament at least once every year, the accounts of the Commission (also known as the accounts of the Clerk of Parliament);

(b). appoint a member of the staff in the Parliamentary Service to be the Accounting Officer responsible for accounting for the sums paid out of money provided by Parliament for the service of Parliament.

Members Pay and Remuneration

12. (1). The Commission should establish an independent body to set and pay the salaries, allowances and benefits (such as pensions) of Members of Parliament in accordance with the relevant resolutions of Parliament -

(a). that is subject to anything done in exercise of the disciplinary powers of the Parliament;

(b). that payments are made in a fair and equitable manner regardless of a Members’ partisanship, gender, religion, sexuality, race or ethnicity;

(c). to be reviewed on an annual basis;

(d). to be released in a timely manner.
Additional Revenue Raising Powers

13. (1). The Commission must have the power to seek and receive financial assistance to strengthen the institution of Parliament, including, by sourcing funds from international donors, corporate sponsorship and commercial use of the Parliamentary precinct.

(2). The Commission must have an open and transparent process in which it seeks and receives its financial assistance in compliance with government or parliamentary procurement policies.
PART 5

Parliamentary Service

14. (1). There is established by this Act a Parliamentary Service, referred to in this Act as “the Service”.

(2). The Service is not an instrument of the executive government.

(3). The Service must comprise such officers and departments as may be prescribed and determined by the Commission.

(4). The Service will be outside the jurisdiction of the Public Service and the Public Service Commission.

(5). The Service may, with the approval of the Commission, provide administrative and support services for the following persons and agencies -

   (a). any officer of the Parliament;
   (b). any office of Parliament;
   (c). any department or other instrument of the Parliament.

Clerk of the Parliament

15. (1). There must be a Clerk of the Parliament who must be the Head of the Parliamentary Service and is to be responsible for the day to day business of the Parliamentary Service and must report to the Commission.

(2). The Clerk must be the Senior Accounting Officer and Corporate Officer of Parliament and must have the power to enter into contracts on behalf of the Commission.

(3). The Clerk of the Parliament must be appointed by a resolution of Parliament on the recommendations of the Parliamentary Services Commission and Public Services Commission, or its equivalent.

(4). The Clerk of Parliament is not subject to the direction of the Executive.

(5). The Commission must set the pay, allowances, benefits, pensions and terms and conditions of employment which is commensurate with the role of Clerk of Parliament.

Principal functions of the Parliamentary Service

16. (1). The principal functions of the Parliamentary Service are—

   (a). to provide administrative and support services to the Parliament, its Members and any committee or agency of the Parliament for the purpose of ensuring the full and effective exercise of the powers of Parliament;

   (b). to provide such other services as the Parliament may by resolution determine.
PART 6

Transitional Provisions

17. (1) Staff must be deemed to be appointed to the Parliamentary Service, if immediately before the commencement of this Act, they:

   (a). were employed by the former legislative service, or;

   (b). assigned or seconded to Parliament by the public service.

(2). Staff must have the option to remain in the Parliamentary Service or to be redeployed to the public service.

(3). A person who fails to exercise the option conferred by subsection (2) within a period specified by the Parliamentary Service Commission, must be deemed to have opted to retire from the Service.
FURTHER READING

Publications


CPA (2018) CPA Recommended Benchmarks for Democratic Legislatures


Example Legislation

Legislative Assembly (Office of the Legislative Assembly) Act, 2012, ACT

Parliamentary Service Act 1999, Commonwealth of Australia

Parliament of Canada Act 1985, Canada

Parliamentary Service Act – 1993, Ghana


Parliamentary Service Act 2000, New Zealand

Appropriation (Parliament) Act 2019, Queensland

The Scotland Act 2012, Scotland

The Administration of Parliament (Amendment) Act, 2006, Uganda

House of Commons (Administration) Act 1978, United Kingdom

House of Commons Commission Act 2015, United Kingdom

The Parliamentary Service Act, 2016, Zambia
APPENDIX

Where applicable, the following Commonwealth-wide guidelines, principles and standards have been in incorporated into the Model Law. There are however other international standards which could be added.

Commonwealth Latimer House Principles

Section III of the Principles state:
Independence of Parliamentarians: (a) Parliamentarians must be able to carry out their legislative and constitutional functions in accordance with the Constitution, free from unlawful interference.

Commonwealth Charter

In March 2013, the first Commonwealth Charter adopted by Commonwealth Heads of Government validated the Latimer House Principles on maintaining integrity of the three branches of government (article VI).

“We recognise the importance of maintaining the integrity of the roles of the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary. These are the guarantors in their respective spheres of the rule of law, the promotion and protection of fundamental human rights and adherence to good governance.”

CPA Recommended Benchmarks for Democratic Legislatures

1.5 Remuneration and Benefits
1.5.1 Fair remuneration and reimbursement of parliamentary expenses shall be provided to legislators for their service, to ensure that they give priority to parliamentary duties. All forms of compensation shall be allocated on a non-partisan basis.
1.5.2 An independent body or mechanism should determine the remuneration, benefits and other statutory entitlements of legislators.

5. General
5.11 The Legislature, rather than the Executive branch, shall control the parliamentary service and determine the terms of employment. There shall be adequate safeguards to ensure non-interference from the Executive.

5.4 Organisation and Management
5.4.1 The head of the parliamentary service shall have a form of protected status defined in legislation or in the Constitution to prevent undue political pressure.
5.4.2 The remuneration of the head of the parliamentary service shall be set by an independent body or mechanism.
5.4.3 The Legislature should, either by legislation or resolution, establish a corporate body responsible for providing services and funding entitlements for parliamentary purposes and providing for governance of the parliamentary service.

7.2 Financial and Budget Oversight
7.2.6 The Legislature shall have access to sufficient financial scrutiny resources and/or independent budget and financial expertise to ensure that financial oversight is conducted effectively.

CPA Study Group on Finance and Administration of Parliaments

The Zanzibar Recommendations

In conclusion, the Study Group made the following recommendations which were subsequently endorsed by Parliaments across Africa, Asia and India. They were:
The Independence and Integrity of Parliament

- All Commonwealth Parliaments should implement the Commonwealth Principles on the Accountability of and Relationship Between the Three Branches of Government, especially those relating to the independence of the Legislature.
- Parliamentarians must be able to carry out their legislative and constitutional functions in accordance with their constitution, free from unlawful interference.
- Parliamentarians should maintain high standards of accountability, transparency and responsibility in the conduct of all public and parliamentary matters.

The Governance of Parliament

- Parliaments should, either by legislation or resolution, establish corporate bodies responsible for providing services and funding entitlements for parliamentary purposes and providing for governance of the parliamentary service.
- There should be an unambiguous relationship between the Speaker, the corporate body and the head of the parliamentary service.
- Members of corporate bodies should act on behalf of all Members of the Legislature and not on a partisan or governmental basis.
- The corporate body should determine the range and standards of service to be provided to Parliament, e.g., accommodation, staff, financial and research services.
- Corporate bodies should promote responsible governance that balances the unique needs of Parliament with general legal requirements, e.g., employment law, freedom of information and occupational health and safety.
- The head of the parliamentary service should be appointed on the basis of merit and have some form of protected status to prevent undue political pressure.
- The head of the parliamentary service should be given appropriate levels of delegated authority.

Financial Independence and Accountability

- Parliaments should have control of, and authority to set out and secure, their budgetary requirements unconstrained by the executive.
- The remuneration package for Parliamentarians should be determined by an independent process.
- The corporate body should ensure that an effective accountability framework is in place.
- Corporate bodies should ensure regular monitoring of actual expenditure against the amount of money appropriated for parliamentary services.
- The corporate body should ensure compliance with generally accepted accounting standards.
- The head of the parliamentary service should have ultimate financial responsibility for the Legislature.

Parliamentary Service

- Parliaments should be served by a professional staff independent of the public service and dedicated to supporting Parliamentarians in fulfilling their constitutional role.
- The corporate body should ensure that the parliamentary service is properly remunerated and that retention strategies are in place.
- The statutory terms and conditions for the parliamentary service should be based on the needs of the Legislature and not constrained by those of the public service.
- There should be a code of conduct and values for members of the parliamentary service.
- The parliamentary service should include not just procedural specialists, but staff with specialized expertise, e.g., finance, ICT, human asset management, research and communications.
- Effective recruitment on the basis of merit and equal opportunity strategies should be in place that will ensure that the parliamentary service is representative of the diversity of the wider community.
- Corporate bodies should promote an environment that encourages best practices for employee well-being.

Public Accountability

- The corporate body should publish an annual report on its work on behalf of the Legislature including information on the audited accounts and budget estimates.
- There should be an information strategy detailing how the membership and operations of the Legislature will be communicated to the general public.
- Parliaments should develop programmes to promote the general public's understanding of the work of the Legislature and, in particular, to involve school children in increasing their awareness of citizenship issues.
- The corporate body should ensure that the media are given appropriate access to the proceedings of Parliament without compromising the dignity and integrity of the institution.
At the close of the workshop, recommendations were proposed and endorsed as follows:

• Through Parliament, people exercise their sovereign power. Parliaments must diligently secure practical and well-executed constitutional separation of powers for greater democratic dividends and good governance.

• Parliaments should seek to replicate Gujarat’s approach to ensure the doctrine of separation of powers is well entrenched in constitutions, and that legislation passed, is done so in a transparent manner.

• As the stark reality of the authoritarian tendency of the Executive, Parliamentarians must be able to speak their mind in debates, without fear or favour.

• The Commonwealth Lawyers Association supports the promotion of and training in the Commonwealth Latimer House Principles and notes:
  - the continuing need for implementation and compliance by Governments, particularly to ensure that Legislatures have robust independent accountability mechanisms (e.g. through Select Committees) by which Ministers are held to account; and
  - the need to ensure the peer review mechanism by the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) is appropriate and effective.